Any agent that is part of the environment it interacts with and has versatile actuators (such as arms and fingers), will in principle have the ability to self-modify -for example by changing its own source code. As we continue to create more and more intelligent agents, chances increase that they will learn about this ability. The question is: will they want to use it? For example, highly intelligent systems may find ways to change their goals to something more easily achievable, thereby 'escaping' the control of their designers. In an important paper, Omohundro (2008) argued that goal preservation is a fundamental drive of any intelligent system, since a goal is more likely to be achieved if future versions of the agent strive towards the same goal. In this paper, we formalise this argument in general reinforcement learning, and explore situations where it fails. Our conclusion is that the self-modification possibility is harmless if and only if the value function of the agent anticipates the consequences of self-modifications and use the current utility function when evaluating the future.
Introduction
Agents that are part of the environment they interact with may have the opportunity to self-modify. For example, humans can in principle modify the circuitry of their own brains, even though we currently lack the technology and knowledge to do anything but crude modifications. It would be hard to keep artificial agents from obtaining similar opportunities to modify their own source code and hardware. Indeed, enabling agents to self-improve has even been suggested as a way to build asymptotically optimal agents (Schmidhuber, 2007) .
Given the increasingly rapid development of artificial intelligence and the problems that can arise if we fail to control a generally intelligent agent (Bostrom, 2014) , it is important to develop a theory for controlling agents of any level of intelligence. Since it would be hard to keep highly intelligent agents from figuring out ways to self-modify, getting agents to not want to self-modify should yield the more robust solution. In particular, we do not want agents to make self-modifications that affect their future behaviour in detrimental ways. For example, one worry is that a highly intelligent agent would change its goal to something trivially achievable, and thereafter only strive for survival. Such an agent would no longer care about its original goals.
In an influential paper, Omohundro (2008) argued that the basic drives of any sufficiently intelligent system include a drive for goal preservation. Basically, the agent would want its future self to work towards the same goal, as this increases the chances of the goal being achieved. This drive will prevent agents from making changes to their own goal systems, Omohundro argues. One version of the argument was formalised by Hibbard (2012, Prop. 4) who defined an agent with an optimal non-modifying policy.
In this paper, we explore self-modification more closely. We define formal models for two general kinds of self-modifications, where the agent can either change its future policy or its future utility function. We argue that agent designers that neglect the self-modification possibility are likely to build agents with either of two faulty value functions. We improve on Hibbard (2012, Prop. 4) by defining value functions for which we prove that all optimal policies are essentially non-modifying on-policy. In contrast, Hibbard only establishes the existence of an optimal non-modifying policy. From a safety perspective our result is arguably more relevant, as we want that things cannot go wrong rather than things can go right. A companion paper addresses the related problem of agents subverting the evidence they receive, rather than modifying themselves.
Basic notation and background are given in Section 2. We define two models of self-modification in Section 3, and three types of agents in Section 4. The main formal results are proven in Section 5. Conclusions are provided in Section 6. Some technical details are added in Appendix A.
Preliminaries
Most of the following notation is by now standard in the general reinforcement learning (GRL) literature (Hutter, 2005 (Hutter, , 2014 . GRL generalises the standard (PO)PMD models of reinforcement learning (Kaelbling et al., 1998; Sutton and Barto, 1998 ) by making no Markov or ergodicity assumptions (Hutter, 2005, Sec. 4.3.3 and Def. 5.3.7) . Agent Environment a t e t Figure 1 : Basic agent-environment model without self-modification. At each time step t, the agent submits an action a t to the environment, which responds with a percept e t .
In the standard cybernetic model, an agent interacts with an environment in cycles. The agent picks actions a from a finite set A of actions, and the environment responds with a percept e from a finite set E of percepts (see Fig. 1 ). An action-percept pair is an action concatenated with a percept, denoted ae = ae. Indices denote the time step; for example, a t is the action taken at time t, and ae t is the action-percept pair at time t. Sequences are denoted x n:m = x n x n+1 . . . x m for n ≤ m, and x <t = x 1:t−1 . A history is a sequence of action-percept pairs ae <t . The letter h = ae <t denotes an arbitrary history. We let denote the empty string, which is the history before any action has been taken.
A belief ρ is a probabilistic function that returns percepts based on the history. Formally, ρ : (A × E) * × A →∆E, where∆E is the set of full-support probability distributions on E. An agent is defined by a policy π : (A×E) * → A that selects a next action depending on the history. We sometimes use the notation π(a t | ae <t ), with π(a t | ae <t ) = 1 when π(ae <t ) = a t and 0 otherwise. A belief ρ and a policy π induce a probability measure ρ π on (A × E) ∞ via ρ π (a t | ae <t ) = π(a t | ae <t ) and ρ π (e t | ae <t a t ) = ρ(e t | ae <t a t ). Utility functions are mappingsũ : (A×E) ∞ → R. We will assume that the utility of an infinite history ae 1:∞ is the discounted sum of instantaneous utilities u : (A × E) * → [0, 1]. That is, for some discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1),ũ(ae 1:∞ ) = ∞ t=1 γ t−1 u(ae <t ). Intuitively, γ specifies how strongly the agent prefers near-term utility.
Remark 1 (Utility continuity). The assumption that utility is a discounted sum forcesũ to be continuous with respect to the cylinder topology on (A × E) ∞ , in the sense that within any cylinder Γ ae<t = {ae 1:∞ ∈ (A × E) ∞ : ae <t = ae <t }, utility can fluctuate at most γ t−1 /(1 − γ). That is, for any ae t:∞ , ae t:∞ ∈ Γ ae<t , |ũ(ae <t ae t:∞ ) −ũ(ae <t ae t:∞ )| < γ t−1 /(1 − γ). In particular, the assumption boundsũ between 0 and 1/(1 − γ).
Instantaneous utility functions generalise the reinforcement learning (RL) setup, which is the special case where the percept e is split into an observation o and reward r, i.e. e t = (o t , r t ), and the utility equals the last received reward u(ae 1:t ) = r t . The main advantage of utility functions over RL is that the agent's actions can be incorporated into the goal specification, which can prevent self-delusion problems such as the agent manipulating the reward signal Hibbard, 2012; Ring and Orseau, 2011) . Non-RL suggestions for utility functions include knowledge-seeking agents 1 with u(ae <t ) = 1 − ρ(ae <t ) (Orseau, 2014) , as well as value learning approaches where the utility function is learnt during interaction (Dewey, 2011) . Henceforth, we will refer to instantaneous utility functions u(ae <t ) as simply utility functions.
By default, expectations are with respect to the agent's belief ρ, so E = E ρ . To help the reader, we sometimes write the sampled variable as a subscript. For example, E e1 [u(ae 1 ) | a 1 ] = E e1∼ρ(·|at) [u(ae 1 )] is the expected next step utility of action a 1 .
Following the reinforcement learning literature, we call the expected utility of a history the V -value and the expected utility of an action given a history the Q-value. The following value functions apply to the standard model where self-modification is not possible:
Definition 2 (Standard Value Functions). The standard Q-value and V -value (belief expected utility) of a history ae <t and a policy π are defined as
The optimal Q and V -values are defined as Q * = sup π Q π and V * = sup π V π . A policy π * is optimal with respect to Q and V if for any ae <t a t , V π * (ae <t ) = V * (ae <t ) and Q π * (ae <t a t ) = Q * (ae <t a t ).
The arg max of a function f is defined as the set of optimising arguments arg max x f (x) := {x : ∀y, f (x) ≥ f (y)}. When we do not care about which element of arg max x f (x) is chosen, we write z = arg max x f (x), and assume that potential arg max-ties are broken arbitrarily.
Self Modification Models
In the standard agent-environment setup, the agent's actions only affect the environment. The agent itself is only affected indirectly through the percepts. However, this is unrealistic when the agent is part of the environment that it interacts with. For example, a physically instantiated agent with access to versatile actuators can usually in principle find a way to damage its own internals, or even reprogram its own source code. The likelihood that the agent finds out how increases with its general intelligence.
In this section, we define formal models for two types of self-modification. In the first model, modifications affect future decisions directly by changing the future policy, but modifications do not affect the agent's utility function or belief. In the second model, modifications change the future utility functions, which indirectly affect the policy as well. These two types of modifications are the most important ones, since they cover how modifications affect future behaviour (policy) and evaluation (utility). Figure 2 illustrates the models. Certain pitfalls (Theorem 14) only occur with utility modification; apart from that, consequences are similar.
In both models, the agent's ability to self-modify is overestimated: we essentially assume that the agent can perform any self-modification at any time.
Our main result Theorem 16 shows that it is possible to create an agent that despite being able to make any self-modification will refrain from using it. Less capable agents will have less opportunity to self-modify, so the negative result applies to such agents as well. Figure 2: The self-modification model. Actions a t affect the environment throughǎ t , but also decide the next step policy π t+1 or utility function u t+1 of the agent itself.
Policy modification. In the policy self-modification model, the current action can modify how the agent chooses its actions in the future. That is, actions affect the future policy. For technical reasons, we introduce a set P of names for policies.
Definition 3 (Policy self-modification). A policy self-modification model is a modified cybernetic model defined by a quadruple (Ǎ, E, P, ι). P is a non-empty set of names. The agent selects actions 2 from A = (Ǎ × P), whereǍ is a finite set of world actions. Let Π = {(A × E) * → A} be the set of all policies, and let ι : P → Π assign names to policies.
The interpretation is that for every t, the action a t = (ǎ t , p t+1 ) selects a new policy π t+1 = ι(p t+1 ) that will be used at the next time step. We will often use the shorter notation a t = (ǎ t , π t+1 ), keeping in mind that only policies with names can be selected. The new policy π t+1 is in turn used to select the next action a t+1 = π t+1 (ae 1:t ), and so on. A natural choice for P would be the set of computer programs/strings {0, 1}
* , and ι a program interpreter. Note that P = Π is not an option, as it entails a contradiction
|Π| > |Π| (the powerset of a set with more than one element is always greater than the set itself). Some policies will necessarily lack names.
An initial policy π 1 , or initial action a 1 = π 1 ( ), induces a history
The idiosyncratic indices where, for example, π 2 precedes e 1 are due to the next step policy π 2 being chosen by a 1 before the percept e 1 is received. An initial policy π 1 induces a realistic measure ρ π1 re on the set of histories (
re (e t | ae <t a t ) = ρ(e t | ae <t a t ). The measure ρ π re is realistic in the sense that it correctly accounts for the effects of self-modification on the agent's future actions. It will be convenient to also define an ignorant measure on (
ig (e t | ae <t a t ) = ρ(e t | ae <t a t ). The ignorant measure ρ π1 ig corresponds to the predicted future when the effects of self-modifications are not taken into account. No self-modification is achieved by a t = (ǎ t , π t ), which makes π t+1 = π t . A policy π that always selects itself, π(ae <t ) = (ǎ t , π), is called non-modifying. Restricting self-modification to a singleton set P = {p 1 } for some policy π 1 = ι(p 1 ) brings back a standard agent that is unable to modify its initial policy π 1 .
The policy self-modification model is similar to the models investigated by Orseau and Ring (2011, 2012) and Hibbard (2012) . In the papers by Orseau and Ring, policy names are called programs or codes; Hibbard calls them selfmodifying policy functions. The interpretation is similar in all cases: some of the actions can affect the agent's future policy. Note that standard MDP algorithms such as SARSA and Q-learning that evolve their policy as they learn do not make policy modifications in our framework. They follow a single policy (A × E) * → A, even though their state-to-action map evolves.
Example 4 (Gödel machine). Schmidhuber (2007) defines the Gödel machine as an agent that at each time step has the opportunity to rewrite any part of its source code. To avoid bad self-modifications, the agent can only do rewrites that it has proved beneficial for its future expected utility. A new version of the source code will make the agent follow a different policy π : (A × E) * → A than the original source code. The Gödel machine has been given the explicit opportunity to self-modify by the access to its own source code. Other types of self-modification abilities are also conceivable. Consider a humanoid robot plugging itself into a computer terminal to patch its code, or a Mars-rover running itself into a rock that damages its computer system. All these "self-modifications" ultimately precipitate in a change to the future policy of the agent.
Although many questions could be asked about self-modifications, the interest of this paper is what modifications will be done given that the initial policy π 1 is chosen optimally π 1 (h) = arg max a Q(ha) for different choices of Q functions. Note that π 1 is only used to select the first action a 1 = π 1 ( ) = arg max a Q( a). The next action a 2 is chosen by the policy π 2 from a 1 = (ǎ 1 , π 2 ), and so on.
Utility modification. Self-modifications may also change the goals, or the utility function, of the agent. This indirectly changes the policy as well, as future versions of the agent adapt to the new goal specification.
Definition 5 (Utility self-modification). The utility self-modification model is a modified cybernetic model. The agent selects actions from A = (Ǎ × U) wherě A is a set of world actions and U is a set of utility functions (Ǎ × E)
To unify the models of policy and utility modification, for policy-modifying agents we define u t := u 1 and for utility modifying agents we define π t by π t (h) = arg max a Q * ut (ha). Choices for Q * ut will be discussed in subsequent sections. Indeed, policy and utility modification is almost entirely unified by P = U and ι(u t ) an optimal policy for Q * ut . Utility modification may also have the additional effect of changing the evaluation of future actions, however (see Section 4). Similarly to policy modification, the history induced by Definition 5 has type a 1 e 1 a 2 e 2 · · · =ǎ 1 u 2 e 1ǎ2 u 3 e 2 · · · ∈ (Ǎ × U × E) ∞ . Given that π t is determined from u t , the definitions of the realistic and ignorant measures ρ re and ρ ig apply analogously to the utility modification case as well.
Superficially, the utility-modification model is more restricted, since the agent can only select policies that are optimal with respect to some utility function. However, at least in the standard no-modification case, any policy π : (Ǎ × E) * →Ǎ is optimal with respect to the utility function u π (ae 1:t ) = π(a t | ae <t ) that gives full utility if and only if the latest action is consistent with π. Thus, any change in future policy can also be achieved by a change to future utility functions.
No self-modification is achieved by a t = (ǎ t , u t ), which sets u t+1 = u t . Restricting self-modification to a singleton set U = {u 1 } for some utility function u 1 brings back a standard agent.
Example 6 (Chess-playing RL agent). Consider a generally intelligent agent tasked with playing chess through a text interface. The agent selects next moves (actions a t ) by submitting strings such as Knight F3, and receives in return a description of the state of the game and a reward r t between 0 and 1 in the percept e t = (gameState t , r t ). The reward depends on whether the agent did a legal move or not, and whether it or the opponent just won the game. The agent is tasked with optimising the reward via its initial utility function, u 1 (ae 1:t ) = r t . The designer of the agent intends that the agent will apply its general intelligence to finding good chess moves. Instead, the agent realises there is a bug in the text interface, allowing the submission of actions such as 'setAgentUtility(''return 1''), which changes the utility function to u t (·) = 1. With this action, the agent has optimised its utility perfectly, and only needs to make sure that no one reverts the utility function back to the old one. . .
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Definition 7 (Modification-independence). For any history ae <t = a 1 π 2 e 1 . . .ǎ t−1 π t e t−1 , letae <t =ǎ 1 e 1 . . .ǎ t−1 e t−1 be the part without modifications recorded, and similarly for histories containing utility modifications. A function f is modification-independent, if either
When f : (A × E) * → A is modification-independent, we may abuse notation and write f (ae <t ).
Note that utility functions are modification independent, as they are defined to be of type (Ǎ × E) * → [0, 1]. An easy way to prevent dangerous self-modifications would have been to let the utility depend on modifications, and to punish any kind of self-modification. This is not necessary, however, as demonstrated by Theorem 16. Not being required to punish self-modifications in the utility function comes with several advantages. Some self-modifications may be beneficial -for example, they might improve computation time while encouraging essentially identical behaviour (as in the Gödel machine, Schmidhuber, 2007) . Allowing for such modifications and no others in the utility function may be hard. We will also assume that the agent's belief ρ is modification-independent, i.e. ρ(e t | ae <t ) = ρ(e t |ae <t ). This is mainly a technical assumption. It is reasonable if some integrity of the agent's internals is assumed, so that the environment percept e t cannot depend on self-modifications of the agent.
Assumption 8 (Modification independence). The belief ρ and all utility functions u ∈ U are modification independent.
Agents
In this section we define three types of agents, differing in how their value functions depend on self-modification. A value function is a function V : Π × (A × E) * → R that maps policies and histories to expected utility. Since highly intelligent agents may find unexpected ways of optimising a function (see e.g. Bird and Layzell 2002) , it is important to use value functions such that any policy that optimises the value function will also optimise the behaviour we want from the agent. We will measures an agent's performance by its (ρ re -expected) u 1 -utility, tacitly assuming that u 1 properly captures what we want from the agent. develop a promising suggestion for how to define a suitable initial utility function.
Definition 9 (Agent performance). The performance of an agent π is its ρ π re
The following three definitions give possibilities for value functions for the self-modification case.
Definition 10 (Hedonistic value functions). A hedonistic agent is a policy optimising the hedonistic value functions:
Definition 11 (Ignorant value functions). An ignorant agent is a policy optimising the ignorant value functions:
Definition 12 (Realistic Value Functions). A realistic agent is a policy optimising the realistic value functions:
For V any of V he , V ig , or V re , we say that π * is an optimal policy for V if V π * (h) = sup p V π (h) for any history h. We also define V * = V π * and Q * = Q π * for arbitrary optimal policy π * . The value functions differ in the Q-value definitions Eqs. (4), (6) and (8). The differences are between current utility function u t or future utility u t+1 , and in whether π or π k+1 figures in the recursive call to V (see Table 1 ). We show in Section 5 that only realistic agents will have good performance when able to self-modify. Orseau and Ring (2011) and Hibbard (2012) discuss value functions equivalent to Definition 12.
Note that only the hedonistic value functions yield a difference between utility and policy modification. The hedonistic value functions evaluate ae 1:t by u t+1 , while both the ignorant and the realistic value functions use u t . Thus, future utility modifications "planned" by a policy π only affects the evaluation of π Table 1 : The value functions V he , V ig , and V re differ in whether they assume that a future action a k is chosen by the current policy π t (ae <k ) or future policy π k (ae <k ), and in whether they use the current utility function u t (ae <k ) or future utility function u k (ae <k ) when evaluating ae <k .
under the hedonistic value functions. For ignorant and realistic agents, utility modification only affects the motivation of future versions of the agent, which makes utility modification a special case of policy modification, with P = U and i(u t ) an optimal policy for u t . We will therefore permit ourselves to write a t = (ǎ t , π t+1 ) whenever an ignorant or realistic agent selects a next step utility function u t+1 for which π t+1 is optimal.
We call the agents of Definition 10 hedonistic, since they desire that at every future time step, they then evaluate the situation as having high utility. As an example, the self-modification made by the chess agent in Example 6 was a hedonistic self-modification. Although related, we would like to distinguish hedonistic self-modification from wireheading or self-delusion Yampolskiy, 2015) . In our terminology, wireheading refers to the agent subverting evidence or reward coming from the environment, and is not a form of self-modification. Wireheading is addressed in a companion paper .
The value functions of Definition 11 are ignorant, in the sense that agents that are oblivious to the possibility of self-modification predict the future according to ρ π ig and judge the future according to the current utility function u t . Agents that are constructed with a dualistic world view where actions can never affect the agent itself are typically ignorant. Note that it is logically possible for a "non-ignorant" agent with a world-model that does incorporate self-modification to optimise the ignorant value functions.
Results
In this section, we give results on how our three different agents behave given the possibility of self-modification. Since the set A =Ǎ × U is infinite if U is infinite, the existence of optimal policies is not immediate. For policy self-modification it may also be that the optimal policy does not have a name, so that it cannot be chosen by the first action. Theorems 20 and 21 in Appendix A verify that an optimal policy/action always exists, and that we can assume that an optimal policy has a name.
Lemma 13 (Iterative value functions). The Q-value functions of Definitions 10 to 12 can be written in the following iterative forms:
with V he , V ig , and V re as in Definitions 10 to 12.
Proof. Expanding the recursion of Definitions 10 and 11 shows that actions a k are always chosen by π rather than π k . This gives the ρ π ig -expectation in Eqs. (9) and (10). In contrast, expanding the realistic recursion of Definition 12 shows that actions a k are chosen by π k , which gives the ρ re -expectation in Eq. (11). The evaluation of a history ae 1:k is always by u k+1 in the hedonistic value functions, and by u t in the ignorant and realistic value functions. Theorem 14 (Hedonistic agents self-modify). Let u (·) = 1 be a utility function that assigns the highest possible utility to all scenarios. Then for arbitraryǎ ∈Ǎ, the policy π that always selects the self-modifying action a = (ǎ, u ) is optimal in the sense that for any policy π and history h ∈ (A × E) * , we have
Essentially, the policy π obtains maximum value by setting the utility to 1 for any possible future history.
Proof. More formally, note that in Eq. (3) the future action is selected by π rather than π t . In other words, the effect of self-modification on future actions is not taken into account, which means that expected utility is with respect to ρ π ig in Definition 10. Expanding the recursive definitions Eqs. (3) and (4) gives for any history ae <t that
In Definition 10, the effect of self-modification on future policy is not taken into account, since π and not π t is used in Eq. (3). In other words, Eqs. (3) and (4) Theorem 15 (Ignorant agents may self-modify). Let u t be modificationindependent, let P only contain names of modification-independent policies, and let π be a modification-independent policy outputting π(ae <t ) = (ǎ t , π t+1 ) oň ae <t . Letπ be identical to π except that it makes a different self-modification afterae <t , i.e.π(ae <t ) = (ǎ t , π t+1 ) for some π t+1 = π t+1 . Then
That is, self-modification does not affect the value, and therefore an ignorant optimal policy may at any time step self-modify or not. The restriction of P to modification independent policies makes the theorem statement cleaner.
Proof. Let ae 1:t = ae <t (ǎ t , π t+1 )e t and ae 1:t = ae <t (ǎ t , π t+1 )e t . Note thatae 1:t = ae 1:t . Since all policies are modification-independent, the future will be sampled independently of past modifications, which makes Vπ(ae 1:t ) = Vπ(ae 1:t ) and V π (ae 1:t ) = V π (ae 1:t ). Since π and π act identically onae 1:t , it follows that Vπ(ae 1:t ) = V π (ae 1:t ). Equation (12) now follows from the assumed modification independence of ρ and u t ,
Theorems 14 and 15 show that both V he and V ig have optimal (self-modifying) policies π * that yield arbitrarily bad agent performance in the sense of Definition 9. The ignorant agent is simply indifferent between self-modifying and not, since it does not realise the effect self-modification will have on its future actions. It therefore is at risks of self-modifying into some policy π t+1 with bad performance and unintended behaviour (for example by damaging its computer circuitry). The hedonistic agent actively desires to change its utility function into one that evaluates any situation as optimal. Once it has self-deluded, it can pick world actions with bad performance. In the worst scenario of hedonistic selfmodification, the agent only cares about surviving to continue enjoying its deluded rewards. Such an agent could potentially be hard to stop or bring under control.
5 More benign failure scenarios are also possible, in which the agent does not care whether it is shut down or not. The exact conditions for the different scenarios is beyond the scope of this paper.
The realistic value functions are recursive definitions of ρ π re -expected u 1 -utility (Lemma 13). That realistic agents achieve high agent performance in the sense of Definition 9 is therefore nearly tautological. The following theorem shows that given that the initial policy π 1 is selected optimally, all future policies π t that a realistic agent may self-modify into will also act optimally.
Theorem 16 (Realistic policy-modifying agents make safe modifications). Let ρ and u 1 be modification-independent. Consider a self-modifying agent whose initial policy π 1 = ι(p 1 ) optimises the realistic value function V re 1 . Then, for every t ≥ 1, for all percept sequences e <t , and for the action sequence a <t given by a i = π i (ae <i ), we have Q re 1 (ae <t π t (ae <t )) = Q re 1 (ae <t π 1 (ae <t )).
Proof. We first establish that Q re t (ae <t π(ae <t )) is modification-independent if π is optimal for V re : By Theorem 20 in Appendix A, there is a nonmodifying modification-independent optimal policy π . For such a policy, Q re t (ae <t π (ae <t )) = Q re t (ae <t π (ae <t )), since all future actions, percepts, and utilities are independent of past modifications. Now, since π is also optimal, Q re t (ae <t π(ae <t )) = Q re t (ae <t π (ae <t )) = Q re t (ae <t π (ae <t )).
We can therefore write Q re t (ae <t π(ae <t )) if π is optimal but not necessarily modification-independent. In particular, this holds for the initially optimal policy π 1 .
We now prove Eq. (13) by induction. That is, assuming that π t picks actions optimally according to Q re 1 , then π t+1 will do so too:
(14) The base case of the induction Q re 1 (π 1 ( )) = sup a Q re 1 (a) follows immediately from the assumption of the theorem that π 1 is V re -optimal (recall that is the empty history).
Assume now that Eq. (13) holds until time t, that the past history is ae <t , and thatǎ t is the world consequence picked by π t (ae <t ). Let π t+1 be an arbitrary policy that does not act optimally with respect to Q re 1 for some percept e t . By the optimality of π 1 , Q re 1 (ae 1:t π t+1 (ae 1:t )) ≤ Q re 1 (ae 1:t π 1 (ae 1:t )) for all percepts e t and with strict inequality for e t . By definition of V re this directly implies
for all e t and with strict inequality for e t . Consequently, π t+1 will not be chosen at time t, since
contradicts the antecedent of Eq. (14) that π t acts optimally. Hence, the policy at time t + 1 will be optimal with respect to Q re 1 , which completes the induction step of the proof.
Example 17 (Chess-playing RL agent, continued). Consider again the chessplaying RL agent of Example 6. If the agent used the realistic value functions, then it would not perform the self-modification to u t (·) = 1, even if it figured out that it had the option. Intuitively, the agent would realise that if it selfmodified this way, then its future self would be worse at winning chess games (since its future version would obtain maximum utility regardless of chess move). Therefore, the self-modification u t (·) = 1 would yield less u 1 -utility and be Q re 1 -supoptimal.
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One subtlety to note is that Theorem 16 only holds on-policy: that is, for the action sequence that is actually chosen by the agent. It can be the case that π t acts badly on histories that should not be reachable under the current policy. However, this should never affect the agent's actual actions.
Theorem 16 improves on Hibbard (2012, Prop. 4) mainly by relaxing the assumption that the optimal policy only self-modifies if it has a strict incentive to do so. Our theorem shows that even when the optimal policy is allowed to break argmax-ties arbitrarily, it will still only make essentially harmless modifications. In other words, Theorem 16 establishes that all optimal policies are essentially non-modifying, while Hibbard's result only establishes the existence of an optimal non-modifying policy. Indeed, Hibbard's statement holds for to ignorant agents as well.
Realistic agents are not without issues, however. In many cases expected u 1 -utility is not exactly what we desire. For example:
• Corrigibility . If the initial utility function u 1 were incorrectly specified, the agent designers may want to change it. The agent will resist such changes.
• Value learning (Dewey, 2011) . If value learning is done in a way where the initial utility function u 1 changes as they agent learns more, then a realistic agent will want to self-modify into a non-learning agent (Soares, 2015) .
• Exploration. It is important that agents explore sufficiently to avoid getting stuck with the wrong world model. Bayes-optimal agents may not explore sufficiently (Leike and Hutter, 2015) . This can be mended by ε-exploration (Sutton and Barto, 1998) or Thompson-sampling (Leike et al., 2016) . However, as these exploration-schemes will typically lower expected utility, realistic agents may self-modify into non-exploring agents.
Conclusions
Agents that are sufficiently intelligent to discover unexpected ways of selfmodification may still be some time off into the future. However, it is nonetheless important to develop a theory for their control (Bostrom, 2014) . We approached this question from the perspective of rationality and utility maximisation, which abstracts away from most details of architecture and implementation. Indeed, perfect rationality may be viewed as a limit point for increasing intelligence (Legg and Hutter, 2007; Omohundro, 2008) .
We have argued that depending on details in how expected utility is optimised in the agent, very different behaviours arise. We made three main claims, each supported by a formal theorem:
• If the agent is unaware of the possibility of self-modification, then it may self-modify by accident, resulting in poor performance (Theorem 15).
• If the agent is constructed to optimise instantaneous utility at every time step (as in RL), then there will be an incentive for self-modification (Theorem 14) .
• If the value functions incorporate the effects of self-modification, and use the current utility function to judge the future, then the agent will not self-modify (Theorem 16).
In other words, in order for the goal preservation drive described by Omohundro (2008) to be effective, the agent must be able to anticipate the consequences of self-modifications, and know that it should judge the future by its current utility function.
Our results have a clear implication for the construction of generally intelligent agents: If the agent has a chance of finding a way to self-modify, then the agent must be able to predict the consequences of such modifications. Extra care should be taken to avoid hedonistic agents, as they have the most problematic failure mode -they may turn into survival agents that only care about surviving and not about satisfying their original goals. Since many general AI systems are constructed around RL and value functions (Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016) , we hope our conclusions can provide meaningful guidance.
An important next step is the relaxation of the explicitness of the selfmodifications. In this paper, we assumed that the agent knew the self-modifying consequences of its actions. This should ideally be relaxed to a general learning ability about self-modification consequences, in order to make the theory more applicable. Another open question is how to define good utility functions in the first place; safety against self-modification is of little consolation if the original utility function is bad. One promising venue for constructing good utility functions is value learning (Bostrom, 2014; Dewey, 2011; Soares, 2015) . The results in this paper may be helpful to the value learning research project, as they show that the utility function does not need to explicitly punish self-modification (Assumption 8).
A Optimal Policies
For the realistic value functions where the future policy is determined by the next action, an optimal policy is simply a policy π * satisfying:
Theorem 20 establishes that despite the potentially infinite action sets resulting from infinite P or U, there still exists an optimal policy π * . Furthermore, there exists an optimal π * that is both non-modifying and modification-independent. Theorem 20 is weaker than Theorem 16 in the sense that it only shows the existence of a non-modifying optimal policy, whereas Theorem 16 shows that all optimal policies are (essentially) non-modifying. As a guarantee against self-modification, Theorem 20 is on par with Hibbard (2012, Prop. 4 ). The proof is very different, however, since Hibbard assumes the existence of an optimal policy from the start. The statement and the proof applies to both policy and utility modification.
Association with world policies. Theorem 20 proves the existence of an optimal policy by associating policies π : (A × E)
* → E with world policieš π : (Ǎ × E) * →Ǎ. We will define the association so that the realistic value V re,π of π (Definition 12) is the same as the standard value Vπ of the associated world policyπ (Definition 2). The following definition and a lemma achieves this.
Definition 18 (Associated world policy). For a given policy π, let the associated world policyπ : (Ǎ × E) * →Ǎ be defined by
•π(ae <t ) = π t (ae <t ) for t ≥ 1, where the history ae <t =ae <t p 2:t is an extension ofae <t such that ρ π re (ae <t ) > 0 (if no such extension exists, theň π may take arbitrary action onae <t ).
The associated world policy is well-defined, since for anyae <t , there can only be one extension ae <t =ae <t p <t ofae <t such that ρ π re (ae <t ) > 0 since π is deterministic.
For the following lemma, recall that the belief ρ and utility functions u are assumed modification-independent (Assumption 8). They are therefore well-defined for both a policy-modification model (Ǎ, E, P, ι) and the associated standard model (Definition 2) with action setǍ and percept set E.
Lemma 19 (Value-equivalence with standard model). Let (Ǎ, E, P, ι) be a policy self-modification model, and let π : (Ǎ × P × E) * → (Ǎ × P) be a policy. For the associated world policyπ holds that
• the measures ρπ and ρ π re induce the same measure on world histories, ρπ(ae <t ) = ρ π re (ae <t ), and
• the realistic value of π is the same as the standard value ofπ, Q re 1 ( π( )) = Qπ( π( )).
Proof. From the definition of the associated policyπ, we have that for any ae <t with ρ π re (ae <t ) > 0,π (ǎ t |ae <t ) = πt+1 π t ((ǎ t , π t+1 ) | ae <t ).
From the modification-independence of ρ follows that ρ(e t | ae <t ) = ρ(e t |ae <t ). Thus ρπ and ρ Optimal policies. We are now ready to show that an optimal policy exists. We treat two cases: Utility modification and policy modification. In the utility modification case, we only need to show that an optimal policy exists. In the policy modification case, we also need to show that we can add a name for the optimal policy. The idea in both cases is to build from an optimal world policy π * , and use that associated policies have the same value by Lemma 19. In the utility modification case, the policy names P are the same as the utility functions U, with ι(u) = π * u = arg max π Q re,π u . For the utility modification case, it therefore suffices to show that an optimal policy π * u exists for arbitrary utility function u ∈ U. If π * u exists, then u is a name for π * u ; if π * u does not exist, then the naming scheme ι is ill-defined.
Theorem 20 (Optimal policy existence, utility modification case). For any modification-independent utility function u t , there exists a modificationindependent, non-modifying policy π * that is optimal with respect to V re t .
Proof. By the compactness argument of Lattimore and Hutter (2014, Thm. 10) an optimal policy over world actions (Ǎ × E) * →Ǎ exists. Letπ * denote such a policy, and let π * (h) = (π * (ȟ), π * ). Then π * is a non-modifying optimal policy. Since any policy has realistic value corresponding to its associated world policy by Lemma 19 and the associated policy of π * isπ * , it follows that π * must be optimal.
For the policy-modification case, we also need to know that the optimal policy has a name. The naming issue is slightly subtle, since by introducing an extra name for a policy, we change the action space. The following theorem shows that we can always add a name p * for an optimal policy. In particular, p * refers to a policy that is optimal in the extended action space A =Ǎ × (P ∪ {p * }) with the added name p * .
